INTRODUCTION
The well-known decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 1 that broadened the possible use of EC freedom of establishment by companies incorporated in an EU Member State in recent years only addressed the original divergence between the registered office and the administrative seat and the limits placed by the country of arrival on the 'inbound' transfer of the administrative seat of a foreign company. In contrast, in the Daily Mail case, the ECJ appears to allow Member States to place any limit on the transfer abroad of the administrative seat or the registered office of nationally registered companies and, as a consequence, on identity-preserving company law changes. 2 In other words, European companies can apparently freely decide where to incorporate but are not free to change company law afterwards by deciding to reincorporate elsewhere.
Regarding the question whether the country of incorporation can place limits on the transfer abroad of the administrative seat and/or registered office, Member States follow different approaches and seem to be walking along random paths. A comparative analysis reveals that three solutions are provided by Member States:
(1) the company is liquidated; (2) the decision to reincorporate abroad is ineffective: the new company is regarded as incorporated in the country of arrival, but the company law of the previous country of incorporation continues to apply; (3) the identity-preserving company law change is admitted, provided that the substantive and conflict rules of both the country of departure and the country of arrival are respected.
Surprisingly, these solutions do not run along the boundaries between the 'real seat theory' and the 'incorporation theory': even countries following the latter theory are restrictive in the face of company 'emigration', as will be made clear in the following pages. The reason for the reluctance to allow nationally registered companies to reincorporate abroad is that this decision threatens to jeopardise a number of constituencies, such as creditors, workers and suppliers, who may be affected by the change of jurisdiction, although they are not part of the company and hence not involved in the decision to reincorporate abroad, which is usually in the hands of the general meeting of shareholders. 3 Indeed, a change of the applicable company law means a shift in the set of rules that should be applied to the internal organisation of the company and to its relations with the outside world. For example, if identity-preserving company law changes were allowed, an Italian società per azioni transferring its registered office to France would become a French société anonyme. 4 The company's articles of association should be eventually changed in order to comply with French mandatory rules on the société anonyme, 5 but the most significant consequence is that French rules and principles must be followed even if the articles of association were not formally changed. In other words, identity-preserving company law changes are similar to a conversion of the original company into a new legal form, but, in contrast to a 'national conversion', the company does not merely change its form but also the legal system that regulates its life and activities. 6 This scenario may change in the near future, as a Hungarian court has submitted to the ECJ a request for a preliminary ruling, asking whether EC freedom of establishment also covers the transfer of the registered office and whether the country of departure can place limits on this kind of transfer. 7 It is worth recalling that a few years ago the ECJ rejected, for procedural reasons, a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the District Court of Heidelberg concerning the transfer to Spain of both the administrative seat and the registered office of a German company. 8 The ECJ cannot avoid addressing this issue any longer. The answer will be relevant to the issue at hand, as it will affect any possible mechanism for competition between legal systems as regards company law.
------------------
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5 Under the new applicable company law, the question arises whether any amendment to the memorandum of associations is compatible with mandatory substantive law of the country of incorporation. 6 The conversion of a company incorporated in a given jurisdiction into a new company regulated by a different law (hereinafter, 'international conversion') raises issues that prima facie are similar to the ones raised by 'national transformations'. In both cases, minority shareholders need to be protected against decisions of the majority that could fraudulently harm them, and creditors risk being damaged if the capital requirements or creditor protection under the new law are poorer than in the original jurisdiction. See Nonetheless, it seems to me that the application of the national rules for national conversions might not be sufficient to protect the aforementioned interests, as in our case the company changes its legal system and environment, not just the company 'type' within the same legal system. See Among US and European scholars, it is fiercely debated whether and to what extent competition between legal systems has positive effects. 9 In this context, the following empirical observation is relevant: recent studies show that European firms have widely used the possibility opened up by the ECJ's case law to freely choose the country of incorporation while placing the company's administrative seat in another country. 10 Thus, a demand for a broader freedom of establishment has emerged among firms, and we can argue that this demand would probably extend to identity-preserving company law changes if they were allowed.
Regulatory competition has a supply side and a demand side, just like as any other market. On the supply side, national jurisdictions should compete amongst themselves to attract firms and taxpayers. In order to achieve this goal, we can assume that Member States aim to adopt the best possible company laws and to offer these laws to companies and potential shareholders. On the demand side, firms and potential shareholders seek the most suitable company law offered by national jurisdictions. The question arises whether companies or potential shareholders are allowed both to choose the most suitable company law at the moment of incorporation and to change the applicable company law afterwards without needing to liquidate the company in the original country and incorporating a new one in the country of arrival.
11 However, the outcome of this competition also depends on the rules governing the internal decision to reincorporate. If the board has the competence to decide in favour of reincorporation or the power to a veto the shareholders' decision to reincorporate abroad, the company will move to a jurisdiction that maximises the board's interests, even at the expense of the shareholders. 12 In addition, a key incentive to emigrate is obviously the opportunity to gain from switching to a more advantageous fiscal regime, but we should also consider that tax conflict law is generally based on mandatory and objective connecting factors that are independent from the applicable company law.
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This paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, I will describe the legal issues arising from the application of EC freedom of establishment to companies. The third section addresses the ECJ's case law relating to EC freedom of establishment. It will show that, despite Daily Mail, other decisions of the ECJ do not distinguish between the 'moving out' and 'moving in' of a company.
14 The fourth section addresses the application of conflict and substantive rules to the transfer abroad of the administrative and/or registered office. I will analyse what role is played by conflict law and substantive company law in relation to a transfer of the registered office and/or administrative seat. Conflict law provides an answers to the question whether or not this transfer shifts the applicable company law. Substantive company law, on the other hand, establishes whether the decision to transfer the administrative seat and/or registered office abroad is allowed and whether these decisions produce a liquidation of the company. The fifth section addresses the question whether EC freedom of establishment covers the limits imposed by the country of incorporation on the transfer abroad of the administrative seat and/or registered office. Despite the common interpretation of Daily Mail, I will argue that EU companies already enjoy EC freedom of establishment vis-à-vis the country of incorporation, which cannot liquidate them. I will then discuss the question whether EC freedom of establishment also covers voluntary company law changes.
THE LEGAL ISSUES: A FRAMEWORK

Possible outcomes of company 'emigrations'
It is useful to present in clear words all possible outcomes of the transfer abroad of a company's administrative seat and/or registered office:
(a) Identity-preserving company law change: After the transfer of the administrative seat and/or registered office, the company law of the country of arrival applies. The company retains its legal identity and is not regarded as 
National conflict and substantive law
In order to establish which of the aforementioned effects is produced by a transfer of the administrative seat and/or registered office, we should apply the conflict and substantive law of both the country of arrival and the country of departure.
Regarding the different role played by conflict and substantive rules, it is useful to put in clear words the basic assumption of the present paper. We should then distinguish between two questions: (1) on the one hand, whether the company that transfers abroad its administrative seat and/or registered office is regarded as having been wound up by the country of departure; and (2) on the other hand, whether the transfer of the administrative seat and/or registered office leads to a change of the applicable company law. The question whether and under what conditions the applicable law changes is essentially answered by conflict rules. 15 These rules are aimed at determining the applicable substantive law (i.e., lex societatis) according to specific connecting factors that refer to the law of a given country. Therefore, the applicable company law changes only if the company transfers the connecting factor according to the conflict rules of both the country of departure and the country of arrival. For instance, if the connecting factor applied by conflict law of both countries is the registered office, the transfer of the latter leads to the application of the company law of the country of arrival.
In contrast, the continuity of the legal identity is determined by substantive law no matter what conflict rules are applied. Companies retain their legal identity only if the substantive laws of both the country of arrival and the country of departure agree upon this. 16 The reason is that substantive law -not conflict law -is aimed at determining the prerequisites for the existence of legal persons, that is to say, the circumstances under which a group of persons is regarded by the law as a separated and independent legal subject that can be imbued with rights and duties vis-à-vis the outside world.
EC law
From the viewpoint of EC freedom of establishment, two questions arise after the administrative seat and/or registered office is transferred abroad.
On the one hand, we should ask whether any limit imposed by the conflict or substantive laws of the Member States on the emigration of own companies is compatible with EC freedom of establishment. This question is related to the objective effects of the application of national conflict and substantive laws, irrespective of whether or not shareholders really want to change company law.
On the other hand, we should ask whether EC freedom of establishment awards companies the right vis-à-vis the Member State of incorporation to change the applicable company law without the need to liquidate and reincorporate in the country of arrival. This question concerns the voluntary change of company law. If the answer is positive, this would mean that Member States should provide own companies with a legal procedure aimed at changing the applicable company law without being liquidated.
DEVELOPMENTS IN EC LAW
EC freedom of establishment and EC derivative law
Regarding the question whether EC freedom of establishment also covers identity-preserving company law changes, it should be recalled that pursuant to 16 See the authors quoted in the previous footnote and also G. Article 293 EC, Member States should enter into negotiations to secure mutual recognition of companies and 'the retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another'. As is well known, the Brussels Convention of 1968, 17 which should have allowed identity-preserving company law changes, never entered into force because the Netherlands refused to sign it. Nonetheless, pursuant to the ECJ's case law, it is nowadays accepted that Article 293 EC does not attribute to Member States any exclusive competence in these matters and, therefore, that it does not place any obstacle in the way of the direct application of EC freedom of establishment, as entry into negotiations is required only in 'so far as necessary '. 18 However, derivative community law appears to be moving towards the acceptance of freedom to transfer abroad the registered office and to make identity-preserving company law changes.
First of all, it should be pointed out that two specific legal entities, whose existence is based upon EC regulations, are already allowed to voluntarily change the applicable law without losing their legal identity.
The first of these entities is the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), 19 which is governed by the law of the country where the 'official address' is located. 20 The latter should be located in the Member State where the EEIG or one of its members has its central administration and where the activities of the EEIG are carried on. 21 The applicable law can be changed without liquidation if the EEIG transfers the official address together with the central administration.
The second of these entities is the European Company or Societas Europaea (SE), 22 which for our purposes is more relevant due to its similarity to national public companies. Indeed, the SE is partially regulated by the law of the public company (such as the Aktiengesellschaft in Germany, the société anonyme in France or the società per azioni in Italy) of the Member State where the registered office is located, provided that the administrative seat is located in the same country. 23 In addition, the SE Regulation allows identity-preserving company law 23 SE Regulation, Art. 7. This rule is a pillar in the structure of the Regulation, since the ultimate consequence of a divergence between head office and registered office is the liquidation of the company (SE Regulation, Art. 64(2)).
changes, 24 provided that the SE simultaneously transfers the registered office and the administrative seat to another country. 25 The most significant step towards freedom of 'emigration' is the approval of the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, which bans any obstacle imposed by the country of incorporation of a merging company and provides a framework regulation for the proceedings and timing of the merger. 26 Similarly to what happens in the United States, European limited liability companies now have a legal means whereby they can transfer their registered office and change company law without needing to be liquidated in the country of origin and reincorporated in the country of arrival, as they can incorporate a new company in a different Member State and merge with it afterwards.
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Despite this development, the approval of a directive on identity-preserving company law changes has faced a fierce resistance. The first attempt in 1997 to produce a directive on this topic was abandoned, 28 and the Commission has since launched a public consultation relating to a new proposal regarding the sole transfer of the registered office. 29 Meanwhile, in its report from 2002, 30 the High Level Group of Company Law Experts recommended the urgent adoption of a directive on the transfer of the registered office and on identity-preserving company law changes. The Commission responded to this suggestion with its ------------------ 24 The SE is therefore a suitable vehicle for overcoming Member States' resistance to identity-preserving company law changes. See Enriques, supra n. 11, at p. 84 et seq.
25 SE Regulation, Art. 8(1). It is worth mentioning that the wording used to indicate the 'registered office' of an SE is not identical throughout the European Union. For instance, where the English wording of the SE Regulation refers to the 'registered office', the Italian wording refers to the 'sede sociale' (i.e., the statutory seat), the French to the 'siege sociale' and the German, generically, to the 'Sitz' (seat) of the SE. While Sevic is based on the freedom of establishment stemming from the EC Treaty and should therefore be applied to all companies, the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers addresses only limited liability companies. 27 See Gelter, supra n. 9, at p. 267; Siems, supra n. 31 which regards this issue as one of the priorities in EC company law. The future of this project is still uncertain, and the ECJ once again has the opportunity to move forward faster than the EC representative organs when it decides on the submission of the Cartesio case.
32 But even if the ECJ were to state that EC freedom of establishment covers identity-preserving company law changes, the question nonetheless arises whether there is a need for a directive regulating this issue.
Decisions of the ECJ relating to 'moving in' cases
Although the development in the ECJ's judgments on companies' freedom of establishment has been widely celebrated as the beginning of a widespread competition between the Member States' legal systems to attract the incorporation of firms and companies, the reality is far from being so clear. The ECJ has only addressed limits imposed by the country of arrival on companies transferring their administrative seat into its territory without changing the applicable company law. In fact, these 'liberal' ECJ decisions concern only two issues: (1) the original divergence between the administrative seat and the registered office, as in Centros and Inspire Art, and (2) the transfer of the administrative seat to another Member State after incorporation without changing company law, as in Überseering.
Thus, European citizens can incorporate a new company in any Member State, even if the company does not operate in the country of incorporation at all, provided that the latter accepts an original divergence between the registered office and the administrative seat. After incorporation, the administrative seat can be transferred to another Member State, which cannot impose unjustified obstacles on this transfer.
The ECJ then extended EC freedom of establishment to cross-border mergers. 33 In Sevic, it debated whether German case law, which prohibits cross-border mergers, 34 32 See n. 7 above. 33 Sevic, supra n. 1. 34 This was the dominant opinion according to German legal scholars and courts, based on § 1(1) of the Umwandlungsgesetz [Act on Transformations of Legal Entities] (hereinafter, UmwG), which includes both the conversion of companies into another form and company mergers, pursuant to which, the rules set forth by the UmwG should be applied to entities having their 'seat' in Germany. See H. Schaumburg, 'Grenzüberschreitende Umwandlungen', 87 GmbH Rundschau (GmbHR) (1996) p. 502; Großfeld, supra n. 16, comment 699; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 872 et seq. Other scholars, nonetheless, hold that § 1(1) UmwG does not place an obstacle on cross-border mergers. See H. Kronke, 'Deutsches Gesellschaftsrecht und grenzüberschreitende Strunkturänderungen', ZGR (1994) p. 35; H. Kallmeyer, 'Grenzüber-decided to merge with a German company (Sevic), but the German registrar refused to inscribe the merger in the register, arguing that German substantive law did not permit cross-border mergers even if the resultant company was a German one. 35 The ECJ declared that the German regime was incompatible with EC freedom of establishment, at least as regards 'inbound' mergers, that is to say, when the merger is prohibited by the Member State where the resulting company should be registered. It is not clear whether Sevic can also be applied to limits imposed by the original country of the merging companies, 36 but this should no longer be an issue for limited liability companies since the approval of the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers.
These 'liberal' ECJ decisions thus did not concern the limits imposed on the transfer abroad of the administrative seat and/or registered office by the country of departure. IN summary, we can state that EC freedom of establishment requires Member States of arrival to accept that the administrative seat can diverge from the place of incorporation. On the supply side, Member States can therefore compete to attract companies at an early stage of the decision-making process on where to incorporate a new company. At this stage, shareholders can choose the country that provides the most suitable company law. 37 After incorporation, shareholders can change company law only if this is allowed by the conflict law of both the country of arrival and the country of departure. 
3.3
Decisions of the ECJ relating to 'moving out' cases
In the well-known Daily Mail case, the ECJ addressed the question whether limits placed by the country of departure on the 'emigration' of own companies are compatible with EC freedom of establishment. In this case, an English company decided to transfer abroad its administrative seat and tax domicile (its 'residence' according to the English legal wording). In order to do this, according to English tax law, companies need authorisation from the Treasury, which refused to grant authorisation in this case. It was therefore an issue of tax law rather than company or conflict law. Nonetheless, the ECJ expressed its opinion by means of a very broad statement that is also applicable to conflict law and other limits imposed by the country of departure. The ECJ indeed stated that 'unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and functioning.' 39 As regards national conflict rules, the ECJ stated that the Treaty regards the differences in national legislation concerning the required connecting factor and the question whether the registered office or real head office of a company incorporated under national law may be transferred from one Member State to another as problems which are not resolved by the rules concerning the right of establishment but must be dealt with by future legislation or conventions. 40 Therefore, According to widespread opinion, Daily Mail should be regarded as being 'good law', even following the ECJ's recent decisions on the transfer of the administrative seat, as the ECJ distinguished the matter at issue in Überseering and Inspire Art from the issues debated in Daily Mail, which was therefore not overruled. 42 We should conclude that: (1) the conflict law and company law of
------------------
39 Daily Mail, supra n. 2, recital 19. 40 Ibid., at recital 23. 41 Ibid., at recital 24. 42 See Kieninger, supra n. 37, at p. 694; C. This statement was probably only an obiter dictum in Daily Mail, nonetheless it was used by the ECJ as a ratio decidendi in a decision issued ten years later. In this case, a tax relief based on the law of the country of incorporation of a holding company, which was applicable only if the main activities of the controlling entities were national, was declared as incompatible with EC freedom of establishment. 44 The same argument was applied by the ECJ in the recent Marks & Spencer case, where it held that Even though, according to their wording, the provisions concerning freedom of establishment are directed to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation. 45 It is also worth mentioning the case de Lasteyrie, in which a French citizen who owned a shareholding in a French company transferred his domicile to Belgium. According to French tax law, if a French citizen transfers his or her domicile abroad, unrealised capital gains on his or her shareholdings should be taxed in order to tackle tax avoidance. The ECJ declared these provisions as incompatible with EC freedom of establishment, because 'the transfer of a physical person's tax residence outside the territory of a Member State does not, in itself, imply tax avoidance.' 46 This decision was related to the transfer of a natural person, hence it is debatable whether it should be regarded as relevant to company 'emigration'. 47 We can conclude, therefore, that within the ECJ's case law the distinction between 'moving in' and 'moving out' cases is not as evident and established as it appears to be according to widespread opinion among legal scholars concerning Daily Mail. 48 
NATIONAL CONFLICT AND SUBSTANTIVE RULES
It is worth paying attention to how Member States' laws address the transfer of a company's administrative seat and/or registered office. In order to clarify this issue, the application of conflict law and substantive law will be discussed separately.
------------------
46 De Lasteyrie, supra n. 14, recital 51. 47 See the different opinions held, on the one hand, by Rehm, supra n. 48 See also the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Sevic, recital 45: 'it is evident from this case law that Article 43 EC does not merely prohibit a Member State from impeding or restricting the establishment of foreign operators in its territory, it also precludes it from hindering the establishment of national operators in another Member State. In other words, restrictions 'on entering' or 'on leaving' national territory are prohibited.' In Sevic, the ECJ upheld the conclusions of the Advocate General but unfortunately neither quoted this sentence of the Advocate General nor explicitly admitted that 'moving out' cases should be treated like 'moving in' cases.
4.1
Conflict law
Conflict law families: 'incorporation theories' v. 'real seat theory'
Legal scholars distinguish two kinds of conflict rules: those based on 'real seat theory' and those based on 'incorporation theory'. I would like to point out that this is only a rough distinction and that legal systems that are classified as belonging to the same 'theory' might employ different practical solutions, as will be made clear in the following pages. 49 The distinction between two opposite 'theories' is deeply rooted in a legal tradition that depicts conflict law as formed only by multilateral conflict rules.
50 Following this assumption, company conflict rules refer to a single law, the 'personal statute' of the company, which aims to regulate all questions falling within 'company law'. 51 The same connecting factor, therefore, should establish both whether national law is to be applied and under what circumstances a foreign company should be recognised.
Real legal systems are rather different from this simplified model. National conflict laws, for instance, may apply different unilateral conflict rules to own companies and foreign companies or may provide for a more complex bundling of conflict and substantive rules. Moreover, the outcome also depends on whether conflict rules call for the application only of substantive law or also of conflict rules (i.e., renvoi doctrine).
52 If the conflict law of the country of departure does not follow the renvoi doctrine and a company transfers the connecting factor to another country, then it should only apply the substantive company law of the country of arrival but not its conflict law. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the country of departure, the applicable company law changes independently of the conflict rules of the country of arrival. In contrast, if the conflict law of the country of departure follows the renvoi doctrine, the outcome of the transfer of the connecting factor is different, since we should pay attention to the conflict law   ----------------- of the country of arrival, as this could clash with the conflict law of the country of departure and refer to the law of another country or even refer 'back' to the law of the country of departure. 53 Nonetheless, the distinction between 'real seat theory' and 'incorporation theory' is helpful to understanding the functioning of conflict law, but only if we make clear that such theories are 'ideal' analytical tools rather than a picture of the real world.
54 Therefore, it is more meaningful to depict the two 'theories' as two different 'families' of conflict laws rather than two identical multilateral conflict rules.
Bearing this in mind, we can say that, according to the 'real seat theory', the law of the country where they have their administrative (i.e., 'real') seat should be applied to companies. The connecting factor, therefore, is objective and mandatory, and party autonomy is excluded. 55 Many EU Member States belong to this family, including Spain, France and Belgium, but its purest version, at least before the aforementioned ECJ decisions on EC freedom of establishment, was applied in German and Austrian law.
In contrast, according to 'incorporation theory', the law of the country where they are incorporated should be applied to companies. Therefore, the founders of a company can freely choose the country where they wish to incorporate and the applicable law, notwithstanding that the firms operates in another country. In contrast to the common but oversimplified view, there could be different kinds of incorporation theories, rather than just one, based on the relevant connecting factor. 56 For our purposes, the most significant distinction is between conflict rules referring to the country of the original incorporation and conflict rules referring to the country of any subsequent reincorporation or simply to the country where the registered office is located. Many other Member States of the 53 Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 500 et seq. 54 56 Legal scholars have distinguished between the following connecting factors: (i) the country in whose territory the legal formalities for the incorporation were completed; (ii) the country according to whose law the company is regulated by shareholders (which could be different from the case sub (i) if the company is a mere partnership that does not need any formality in order to come into existence); and (iii) the place where the registered office is located (which could be different from the country of the original incorporation if the country of arrival allows companies to reincorporate in its territory Theoretically, under real seat theory, the transfer abroad of the administrative seat should lead to a change of the applicable company law, provided that the country of arrival does not refer back to the country of origin because it follows the renvoi doctrine. 57 In contrast, the transfer abroad of only the registered office or the statutory seat should not be relevant, as this is not a connecting factor, 58 but this cannot be the case, as the transfer of the registered office abroad makes national law unenforceable. In addition, we should also consider that, according to the First Company Law Directive, 59 the articles of association of limited liability companies need to be inscribed on a public register, which plays a crucial role in the incorporation and should therefore be located in the country according to whose law the company is incorporated.
------------------
60 This is the reason behind the general
57 More specifically, if the conflict law of the country of incorporation follows the renvoi doctrine, the applicable company law changes only if the country of arrival follows 'real seat theory' as well. In contrast, if the country of arrival follows incorporation theory, its conflict law refers back to the country of departure (where the company was originally incorporated) and company law should not change, unless the company has also transferred the registered office (in the latter case, as will be made clear in the following pages, the outcome depends on whether the country of arrival refers to the country of the original incorporation or to the country of any subsequent r-incorporation, and whether the substantive law allows company reincorporation). 58 rule followed by German courts, according to which under real seat theory the administrative seat should coincide with the statutory seat and the public register on which the company is inscribed. 61 This means that companies cannot decide to transfer abroad their administrative seat without transferring the registered office as well, provided that substantive law allows this transfer without liquidation. 
The country of departure follows incorporation theory
As I pointed out above, there are many incorporation theories, depending on the relevant connecting factor. For our purposes, it is relevant to distinguish between conflict rules referring to the country of the original incorporation and conflict rules referring to the country of any subsequent reincorporation. Following a transfer of the registered office abroad, the applicable company law changes only if the conflict law of the country of departure does not refer to the country of the original incorporation but to the country where the company is incorporated and registered, even if the registered office is transferred there afterwards. As will be made clear in the following pages, the applicable company law cannot be changed without the intervention of substantive law, which should allow company reincorporation.
Common law countries, such as England and Ireland, are restrictive vis-à-vis the reincorporation of own companies abroad. The basic principle in common law is that companies are regulated by the law of their 'domicile', which is the country of the original incorporation, where companies should locate their registered office. 63 Hence, the transfer abroad of the registered office does not shift the connecting factor and the applicable law does not change. 64 English and 61 Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 400; Garcimartìn Alférez, supra n. 15, at p. 110; Roth, supra n. 58, at p. 381. 62 64 Farnsworth, supra n. 63, at p. 222 (arguing that, since the applicable law cannot change, the company cannot have a domicile of choice); North and Fawcett, supra n. 52, at p. 175; Dicey, Morris and Collins, supra n. 50, at p. 1337. Dutch and Danish law is similar to English law, as both also follow the incorporation doctrine: the company's emigration is not allowed and the decision to transfer the registered office Irish substantive law also does not allow the transfer abroad of the registered office, based on the consideration that the 'old' company is still existent and the new company is grounded in the country of arrival. 65 Indeed, a seminal decision of an English court, stressing the parallel between natural and legal persons, states that '[t]he domicile of origin, or the domicile of birth, using with respect to a company a familiar metaphor, clings to it throughout its existence'. 66 Other examples of incorporation theory can be found in Italian and Swiss conflict law. According to Italian conflict law, companies are regulated by the law of the country where the incorporation proceedings were carried out. 67 In addition, companies can transfer their registered office abroad, but only if this is done in accordance with the law of all 'involved' countries, that is to say, the country of departure and the country of arrival. 68 Symmetrically, Italian company law explicitly allows companies to transfer their registered office abroad. 69 It follows from these rules that a transfer made according to Italian company law is hindered only if the law of the country of arrival does not consent to it or if the transfer itself is not realised in accordance with such law. 70 Nonetheless, the transfer should not lead to a change of the applicable law, at least not from the viewpoint of Italian conflict rules. Italian case law on this point is not homogenous, but it is worth mentioning that, a few years ago, the Italian Corte di Cassazione decided to liquidate a company exactly because the transfer of its registered office changed the applicable company law. 71 However, this is an isolated decision in Italian case law. In my view, is not consistent with Italian substantive law, which explicitly admits the transfer abroad of the registered office.
------------------
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In contrast, Swiss international company law follows a more liberal path. Pursuant to Swiss private international law, companies are regulated by the law of the State under whose law they are organised, which is a wider connecting factor than the country of the original incorporation. 73 Therefore, Swiss companies can change jurisdiction without being wound up if they comply with Swiss substantive and conflict rules and if the country of arrival permits such identitypreserving inbound reincorporation. From the viewpoint of a country of arrival following real seat theory, any inbound transfer of the administrative seat of a foreign company leads to a change of the applicable company law, irrespective of the conflict rules applied by the country of departure. 75 As I have pointed out above, the registered office should generally be located in the country of the applicable law. Hence, the country of arrival should require the company also to transfer the registered office and to reincorporate according to its own law. 76 This raises the question whether the substantive law of the country of arrival allows this kind of 'inbound' reincorporation. 77 'Real seat' countries do not follow identical solutions regarding this issue.
For example, according to German case law, German company law should be applied to companies transferring their administrative seat to Germany. After the 'inbound' transfer of the administrative seat, the immigrating company should therefore be regarded either (i) as non-existent, since it was not incorporated in accordance with the 'right' law, 78 or (ii) as a mere partnership. 79 Following the aforementioned ECJ decisions on EC freedom of establishment, German case law has abandoned the real seat theory towards companies incorporated in EU and EEA Member States, stressing that EU companies transferring their administrative seat to another Member State should be recognised if they still have their registered office in the country of incorporation. 80 Real seat theory should be still applied to non-EU and German companies. 81 In contrast, France, which is commonly also classified among the 'real seat' countries, 82 although this classification is nowadays debated among legal scholars, 83 accepts company immigration. The immigrating company should transfer its administrative seat together with the registered office and follow the regular national incorporation proceedings in order to become a French company. If the country of arrival follows incorporation theory and a company only transfers its administrative seat, leaving its registered office in the original country, the conflict law of the country of arrival refers back to the law of the country of departure. If the latter accepts this renvoi, then the company will be still regulated by the law of the original country, despite the transfer of the administrative seat. 85 It is worth noting that, if this happens, the coincidence of the registered office and the applicable law is not violated.
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If a company transfers its registered office to a country that follows incorporation theory, we should pay attention to the real connecting factor adopted by the country of arrival. For instance, under English conflict law, foreign companies cannot change the applicable law and reincorporate under English company law, since the connecting factor is the domicile of origin. 87 In contrast, other countries following incorporation theory, allow 'inbound' reincorporation without liquidation. For instance, Swiss law explicitly allows foreign companies to submit themselves to Swiss company law without being liquidated and reincorporated, provided that the original jurisdiction allows this. 88 Italian conflict law also does not place obstacles in front of the inbound transfer of the administrative seat or the registered office, provided that the country of origin, whose law must be applied in accordance with Italian conflict rules, refers back to Italian substantive law. In addition, Italian law provides a typical norm against pseudo-foreign corporations, according to which Italian substantive law applies to companies incorporated abroad that have either their administrative seat or the main centre of their activities in Italy.
------------------
84 Loussouarn, Bourel and Vareilles-Sommières, supra n. 82, comment 709. 85 This is true only if the conflict rules of the home country refer to both conflict and substantive law (renvoi). If the conflict law only calls for the application of substantive law, the company should be governed by the law of the country of arrival, notwithstanding that the conflict law of the latter refers to another law. This should lead to a disagreement between the country of departure and the country of arrival as regards the applicable law.
86 Knobbe-Keuk, supra n. 15, at p. 350; Kieninger, supra n. 37, at p. 694; Menjucq, supra n. 83, at p. 142; Garcimartìn Alférez, supra n. 15, at p. 110; Roth, supra n. 58, at p. 382 and Roth (2005), supra n. 15, at p. 979; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 501. But see also Großfeld, supra n. 16, comment 629 (who holds that German law should consider the company as having been wound up even when the applicable company law does not change). 87 As we have seen in the previous section, the question whether company law changes is determined by conflict law, and the change of the applicable substantive law thus depends on whether the company transfers the connecting factor, according to both the country of departure and the country of arrival. In contrast, substantive company law determines whether the transfer of the administrative seat and/or registered office is allowed. 90 As I have pointed out above, some countries, such as Germany, regard the transfer abroad of the administrative seat and/or registered office as a reason for the liquidation of the company. Other countries, such as England, regard the transfer of the domicile as simply ineffective. In both cases, a company cannot effectively transfer the administrative seat or the registered office without being dissolved in the original jurisdiction and reincorporated in the new one. These solutions are independent from the connecting factors chosen by conflict law: even jurisdictions following incorporation theory could hinder company 'emigration' and jurisdictions following real seat theory could allow identity-preserving company law changes. This will be clarified by means of some examples:
(a) Among countries following incorporation theory, we could take the example of English company law and Italian company law, which do not share the same view regarding the outbound transfer of the registered office. 91 English companies cannot transfer their registered office to Scotland or any other EU Member State. 92 If this happens, as we have already seen, a new company is regarded as having been incorporated in the country of arrival and the 'old' English company is regarded as still existent. 93 Italian law is more liberal, because it permits limited liability companies to transfer their registered office abroad based on a decision of the general meeting, allowing dissenting shareholders to withdraw from the company, 94 although this transfer should not have consequences for the applicable law.
at p. 127; F.M. Mucciarelli, 'Libertà di stabilimento comunitaria e concorrenza tra ordinamenti societari', 27 Giurisprudenza commerciale (2000) società a responsabilità limitata) . But see the decision of the Corte di Cassazione cited supra at n. 71.
(b) Among countries following real seat theory, we can mention German, French and Belgium company law. According to German case law, a company that transfers its actual administrative seat abroad should be regarded as having been wound up, 95 and a decision of the general meeting to transfer the administrative seat and/or registered office abroad is also regarded as a winding-up decision.
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According to other scholars, these decisions are simply void and the company should not be liquidated. 97 Therefore, a German company can transfer abroad neither its administrative seat, nor its registered office, nor both together. French company law, in contrast, explicitly allows limited liability companies and sociétés en commandite simple to transfer their registered office abroad and change company law, but only if the shareholders decide unanimously in favour of such a move. 
Company law of the country of arrival
If the conflict law of the country of departure refers to the company law of the country of arrival and the conflict rules of the latter accept this, the transfer produces a change in the applicable company law. 99 Nonetheless, the company law of the country of arrival could hinder the 'immigration' regardless of the conflict rules that are in force, for instance by requiring the company to reincorporate
------------------
95 See Großfeld, supra n. 16, comment 605 et seq.; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 507 (but only if the company seeks to transfer the administrative seat to a country applying the real seat doctrine). 99 It is always worth paying attention to the substantive law of the country of arrival, because if the latter places obstacles in the way of a transfer, the company is in practice hindered in the transfer of the administrative seat or the registered office. See Knobbe-Keuk, supra n. 15, at p. 353.
in the country without preserving its legal personality. In that case, the original jurisdiction should also regard the company as having been liquidated.
Conclusions
We can sum up the previous sections by stating that identity-preserving company law changes depend on the combined application of the conflict and substantive rules of both the country of incorporation and the country of arrival. From the viewpoint of the country of incorporation, we should distinguish between countries belonging to the 'real seat' family and countries belonging to the 'incorporation' family:
(a) If the country of departure follows real seat theory, the applicable company law changes without liquidation if: (1) substantive company law allows companies to transfer the administrative seat (together with the registered office) and to reincorporate voluntarily in another country without being liquidated; (2) the company follows the relevant procedures and secures the necessary majorities; and (3) the country of arrival accepts the 'inbound' transformation.
(b) If the country of departure follows incorporation theory, the applicable company law changes without liquidation if: (1) substantive company law allows companies to transfer the registered office and to reincorporate voluntarily in the country of arrival; (2) the company follows the relevant procedures and secures the necessary majorities; (3) the relevant conflict law does not only refer to the country of the original incorporation but also to the country where the company was reincorporated afterwards; and (4) the country of arrival accepts the 'inbound' transformation.
EC FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND 'MOVING OUT' CASES
Ambiguities of Articles 43 and 48 EC
I will now once again address EC law, asking whether EC freedom of establishment also covers 'moving out' cases. To answer this question, it is useful to briefly summarise the legal basis of EC freedom of establishment as provided by the Treaty and the ECJ's decisions. The difficulties faced by legal scholars and the ECJ in allowing the transfer of a company's administrative seat or registered office throughout the European Union are due to the ambiguities of Articles 43 and 48 EC, which are not perspicuous with regard to legal entities.
In this regard, it is worth recalling that Article 43 EC provides for two kinds of freedoms. 100 The 'primary' freedom bans every restriction erected by a Member State on the establishment of its nationals in another Member State. Therefore, every citizen of a Member State can move his or her domicile or residence to another Member State, working and living there without being discriminated. The 'secondary freedom' prohibits all restrictions on the establishment of branches or agencies in another Member State. Every citizen of an EU Member State can establish a secondary centre of interest for his or her activities in another Member State.
The same freedoms are granted to firms and companies, as stated in Articles 43(1) and 48 EC. Indeed, according to the latter article, Member States to grant a right to change an 'old' nationality into the one of the country of establishment, since citizenship rules are still within the competence of the Member States.
The application of EC freedom of establishment to companies is not clear, because legal entities do not exist and live per se, as human beings do, but only according to the law of a specific jurisdiction, which grants them legal personality and regulates their internal organisation and their relations with the outside world. This point was stressed by the ECJ in Daily Mail, where it stated that 'companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law'. 102 Far from being a mere theoretical remark, this assumption was used by the ECJ to allow Member States to place limits on the emigration of domestic companies. 103 This is confirmed in Überseering, where the ECJ stated that 'Articles 43 EC and 48 EC require Member State[s] to recognise the legal capacity and, consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings which the company enjoys under the law of its State of incorporation'.
The question therefore arises whether Article 48 EC provides a hidden conflict rule referring to the country of incorporation. Indeed, after the decisions in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, the debate among legal scholars focused mostly on conflict rules, rather than substantive rules, and particularly on whether real seat theory is still compatible with EC freedom of establishment. In the previous pages, I have stressed that not only conflict rules but also substantive rules can raise obstacles to company mobility. Thus, it would be too restrictive an approach to hold that EC freedom of establishment simply provides for a hidden norm on the choice of law that refers to the country of incorporation, 104 as in this way we would address only some of the obstacles to company mobility but not all of them. Moreover, we should also consider that EC law is not placed at the same level as national jurisdictions and that it does not need to fit into legal categories and distinctions stemming from national laws and legal thinking. Therefore, we should argue that EC freedom of establishment prohibits whatever rule may obstruct company mobility in an unreasonable way.
This conclusion allows us to tackle the question whether EC freedom of establishment covers identity-preserving company law changes. As I have pointed out in the previous sections, we should distinguish between two questions: (a) whether the company can transfer the administrative seat and/or registered office abroad without losing its legal identity; and (b) whether a transfer of the administrative seat and/or registered office changes the applicable company law. First, we will ask whether EC freedom of establishment requires Member States to allow national companies to transfer abroad their registered office and/or administrative seat without liquidation. As we have already seen, this question is answered by substantive company law at national level. Second, we will ask whether EC law requires Member States to allow national companies to change the applicable substantive law voluntarily. Whether and under what circumstances the applicable company law changes is a question answered at the national level by conflict rules, while substantive rules are meant to establish the procedure to approve such a decision.
5.2
Company 'migrations' throughout the European Union
Ambiguities of Daily Mail
The first question was explicitly addressed by the ECJ only in relation to countries of arrival, which cannot place obstacles in the way of 'inbound' transfers of the administrative seat and/or registered office.
106
In contrast, in Daily Mail, the ECJ judged the obstacles imposed by the country of departure as compatible with EC law, stating that Articles 43 and 48 EC confer no right on a company incorporated under the legislation of a Member State and having its registered office there to transfer its central management and control to another Member State, while retaining the status of companies incorporated under the legislation of the first Member State. 107 This was not explicitly overruled, as the ECJ distinguished Überseering and Inspire Art from Daily Mail, 108 stressing that unlike the case before the national court in this instance, Daily Mail and General Trust did not concern the way in which one Member State treats a company which is validly incorporated in another Member State and which is exercising its freedom of establishment in the first Member State. 109
------------------
106 Überseering, supra n. Thus, the ECJ stated that restrictions on company 'emigrations' imposed by the country of incorporation are covered by EC freedom of establishment.
As I have remarked above, 112 this was not an isolated statement. On the contrary, it has been used as precedent in at least two other cases that I have already mentioned above, ICI (1998) 113 and Marks & Spencer (2006), 114 in which the ECJ stated that EC freedom of establishment also covers limits imposed by the country of incorporation.
We can conclude, therefore, that the ECJ's case law is far from being uncontroversial as regards the distinction between the 'moving in' and 'moving out' of companies and that the question whether the country of incorporation can place limits on company 'emigrations' still needs to be answered.
5.2.2
Lack of rationale for any distinction between 'moving in' and 'moving out' cases
In this section, I will argue that to distinguish between 'moving out' and 'moving in' cases is not consistent with EC freedom of establishment. We should proceed from the basic norm of Article 48 EC, which extends to legal entities the right to establish themselves in another Member State that Article 43 EC assigns to natural persons. Article 48 raises the question whether Member States can wind up companies that transfer their registered office and/or administrative seat abroad, 'killing' them at the frontier. The inherent diversity between natural and legal persons emerges if we consider that Member States can neither kill their citizens at the frontiers (which is obvious, at least in democratic countries) nor take away their legal capacity if they try to emigrate. In addition, Member States cannot take away the citizenship of somebody who is establishing him or herself in another Member State, this being an unacceptable restriction of EC freedom of establishment.
------------------
Taking Article 48 EC seriously, we should argue that Member States cannot do to companies what they are not allowed to do to individuals . 116 and that they therefore cannot liquidate an emigrating company.
One could nonetheless agree with Daily Mail, stressing that, in contrast to human beings, legal persons are a mere creation of the law. If we continue from this premise, we might argue that it is within Member States' competence to determine under what conditions a legal person can be created and continues to exist . 117 and even to establish whether to offer natural persons the opportunity to form a company instead of carrying on business as individuals. 118 If we admit this, we might also conclude that Member States are free to liquidate national companies that transfer their administrative seat and/or registered office abroad. 119 This argument, after a deeper scrutiny, cannot be praised, as it is merely product of positivistic conceptions of the legal personality and their consequences are squarely in contrast with EC freedom of establishment.
Indeed, if the country of incorporation liquidates companies that transfer their administrative seat and/or registered office abroad, such companies would have only two alternatives: (a) give up their aim to 'emigrate'; or (b) accept being wound up in the original country and reincorporated in the Member State of arrival. After liquidation, the 'emigrating' company no longer exists as a legal entity. We should then ask ourselves who is reincorporating in the country of arrival. The answer is easy: the former shareholders as individuals are incorporating a new company, not the 'old' company, which does not exist anymore. In other words, following the theory that countries of incorporation are free to liquidate emigrating companies, we would then implicitly assume that the shareholders as individuals -not the company -enjoy EC freedom of establishment, which is to say that Article 48 EC is meaningless. 120 This outcome is a complete negation of EC freedom of establishment of legal persons, not a simple limitation of this freedom, 121 and this conclusion is therefore not compatible with the EC Treaty.
It also follows from this conclusion that Article 48 EC, which states that legal persons 'should be treated the same way as a natural person', implicitly interferes with national substantive rules, since it prohibits Member States from liquidating a company that transfers abroad its administrative seat and/or registered office. Member States are free to establish the legal conditions for incorporating a new company under their law, but once the company has been created it is free to exercise EC freedom of establishment throughout the European Union just as individuals do. This outcome should not come as a surprise: the creation of a single market throughout the European Union means precisely that firms based in a Member State should have the opportunity, if they regard it as economically reasonable, to transfer their activities and their administrative seat to another Member State.
5.2.3
Transfer of the registered office
The issue is more complex when it comes to the transfer of the registered office if the company does not simply amend the articles of association but also removes itself from the public register of the country of incorporation and files for registration on the public register of the country of arrival. Such a transfer of the registered office has two possible outcomes: (a) the applicable company law changes to the law of the country of the new registered office and the 'emigrating' company reincorporates in the country of arrival; or (b) if the substantive law does not change despite the transfer, the applicable law becomes unenforceable precisely because the law of the country where the public register is located does not coincide with the applicable law.
------------------
120 Art. 48 EC would only have the role of giving legal entities the right to become shareholders of newly incorporated legal entities. Under a traditional systematic analysis, it is worth mentioning that this argument is consistent with whatever theory of legal personality we select. Even if we think that legal personality only has a fictive nature, being a verbal means to understand a set of rules to be applied to shareholders, we should still reach the conclusion that EC freedom of establishment cannot admit Member States to liquidate emigrating companies, otherwise Art Nonetheless, there is no real reason, from the viewpoint of EC freedom of establishment, to distinguish between the transfer abroad of the administrative seat and the registered office. Even if we hold that EC freedom of establishment does not cover identity-preserving company law changes, it is not possible to infer from this premise that the transfer of the registered office falls outside of the area covered by EC freedom of establishment. We should consider, indeed, that the change of the applicable company law stems from the application of national conflict rules, which diverge in terms of the relevant connecting factor. There is no reason for a different treatment under EC law of the administrative seat and the registered office, since both might well be connecting factors for company law at national level.
This does not mean that Member States are not allowed to place limits on the transfer abroad of the registered office -on the contrary, they can -but, since this transfer is also covered by EC freedom of establishment, any limit eventually imposed by Member States should be justified and proportionate to the need to achieve a public goal. In the wording used by the ECJ in Inspire Art, according to the Court's case law, national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must, if they are to be justified, fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the public interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue, and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. 123 The question arises whether and to what extent the winding-up of the emigrating company is necessary or proportionate to achieving a legitimate public goal. The same issue is raised, among others, by English and Irish law, which does not liquidate the emigrating company but regards the transfer abroad of the original domicile as ineffective. 124 Both rules provide limits on EC freedom of establishment that need to be justified under the proportionality review. The answer to the question whether restrictions are justified under the proportionality review should be provided on a case-by-case basis.
However, Member States cannot justify a winding-up of the emigrating company based on the aim of preserving the coincidence of the registered office and the applicable law, since in the country of departure has at its disposal a less   ---------------- In the previous pages, I have tackled the issues related to the transfer abroad of a company's administrative seat and/or registered office and identity-preserving company law changes, under both national and EC law. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between the different 'families' of conflict rules.
(a) The country of incorporation follows real seat theory. From a conflict law viewpoint, the real seat theory leads to a change of the applicable company law if the company transfers its administrative seat to another country. As a consequence of this rule on the applicable law, real seat countries generally require that the registered office should coincide with the administrative seat. Therefore, at least theoretically, companies transferring both their registered office and their administrative seat abroad should change the applicable company law. Nonetheless, the substantive law of some jurisdictions, such as Germany, does not allow a change of company law, even if the company transfers both its registered office and its administrative seat.
(b) The country of incorporation follows incorporation theory. I have distinguished between two kinds of incorporation theories, according to the connecting factor followed by the conflict rules. If conflict law refers to the country of the original incorporation (or 'domicile'), the transfer abroad of the registered office is ineffective and a new company is regarded as having been incorporated in the country of arrival. Other countries call for the application of the law of any subsequent reincorporation, thus permitting identity-preserving company law changes.
As regards EC law, I have argued that EC freedom of establishment, despite the common interpretation of Daily Mail, allows 'outbound' transfers of the administrative seat and/or registered office. This means that: (1) the theory according to which the country of incorporation is free to liquidate a company that transfers abroad the administrative seat and/or registered office is not compatible with EC freedom of establishment; and (2) Member States can place restrictions on the transfer abroad of the administrative seat and/or registered office, provided that these restrictions are aimed at achieving a legitimate public goal and are proportionate to this goal according to the criteria established by the ECJ's case law.
This outcome leaves open the question whether EC freedom of establishment also covers voluntary company law changes. In other words, the question arises whether Member States have a duty to provide their companies with a legal means to change company law voluntarily without needing to liquidate and reincorporate in the new country. The answer to this question should be in the negative, stressing the parallel between natural and legal persons drawn by Article 48 EC, which aims to extend to legal entities the same freedom of establishment that is granted to natural persons by Article 43 EC. Indeed, EC freedom of establishment does not grant natural persons who establish themselves in another country a right vis-à-vis the original country to change nationality. If we place the nationality of a natural person on the same footing as the lex societatis of a legal person, we should conclude that, pursuant to EC law, Member States do not have a duty to allow national companies to voluntarily change the applicable company law while preserving their legal identity.
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Despite this conclusion, I have argued in the previous pages that EC freedom of establishment also covers the transfer abroad of the registered office. Therefore, the country of incorporation can neither liquidate the company that transfers the registered office abroad nor treat this transfer as ineffective, unless doing so is proportionate to achieving a legitimate public goal, which should be established on a case-by-case basis. The same rule applies even if the transfer abroad of the registered office leads to a company law change.
This conclusion paves the way to a high degree of legal uncertainty regarding the question whether restrictions to company 'emigrations' are justified under EC law. 130 Companies risk not having knowledge in advance of the possible outcome of the transfer abroad of their administrative seat and/or registered office, unless the company and conflict laws of both the country of departure and the country of arrival explicitly admit identity-preserving company law changes. 131 In order to do so, the conflict laws of both the country of departure and the country of arrival should adopt the same connecting factor and agree upon the change of the applicable company law; otherwise the company in question would be regarded as an 'own' company by both countries and would risk becoming a sort of 'hybrid' company or a 'chimera' governed by two jurisdictions. 132 Moreover, even if both countries allow identity-preserving company law changes and their connecting factors coincide, many technical problems arise if the regulations are not harmonised as regards the procedures and the timing of the transfer. 133 This lack of harmonisation could be viewed as a sort of hidden obstacle in the path of outbound transfers, despite the fact that they are formally covered by EC freedom of establishment.
If identity-preserving company law changes are regarded as a relevant step on the path to efficient regulatory competition, it is necessary to clarify this issue through a directive, which, following the examples provided by the SE Regulation   ----------------- and the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, should take into account all interests affected by company mobility and harmonise the timing and procedures of the transfer of the registered office.
